By Sarwar A. Kashmeri
American overseas coverage towards Europe is merrily rolling alongside the trail of least resistance, within the trust that there's not anything fairly amiss with the European-American courting that multilateralism won't repair. no longer precise, argues Kashmeri. The alliance is useless, can't be mounted, and has to be renegotiated. It has now not grown to house Europe's emergence as an immense energy. one of those usa of Europe, with international priorities various from these of the U.S., has arrived at America's doorstep. yet the United States continues to be forging overseas coverage for Europe utilizing chilly battle realities; either Democrats and Republicans anticipate the ecu Union to fall into step, and document for carrier as neededвЂ”under American leadership.
Europe, notwithstanding, has different plans, and because it turns into extra robust at the international level, competing visions of ecu management have emerged. The Iraq battle has introduced them into stark aid. for instance, as Kashmeri issues out, the Atlantic divide over Iraq used to be extra approximately French-British pageant for management of Europe than it was once a few department among American pursuits and eu targets. He portrays British international coverage as out of contact with fact, as a coverage that has performed a disservice to the USA due to the Blair government's exaggerated and self-serving view of the British-American specified dating. Kashmeri concludes with prescriptions for forging a brand new alliance in line with a different dating with the ecu Union. This time table is electrified through the options of the leaders who spoke to the writer particularly for this ebook, between them former president George H. W. Bush, former British top minister John significant, James A. Baker III, Wesley okay. Clark, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Volcker, U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel, and Caspar W. Weinberger.
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Extra info for America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide
In less than a month these NATO forces were patrolling the East Coast of America. Could not an equally symbolic way have been found by the United States to harness NATO in the war against Afghanistan? This cavalier treatment of an organization purportedly at the heart of the American-European relationship certainly did not help matters as the Iraqi crisis unfolded; it seemed to me another reflection of the true state of the transatlantic alliance. Paul Volcker I met with Paul Volcker on a summer morning in his sunny corner office overlooking that icon of American capitalism—New York’s Rockefeller Center.
The fluid and dynamic nature of the terrorist threat meant America could no longer take the time to build a consensus for action with its traditional allies, and it did not need them to fight its wars anyway. America alone would decide on a course of action, and, once it had made this decision, it would ask for a show of hands and charge ahead with a coalition of whatever countries were willing to support its case, irrespective of their size or potential contribution to the war effort, and irrespective of whether they were democracies or dictatorships.
We did not think that through very well, and those are also important lessons I hope we can learn,” he told me. 28 America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq Hagel is on particularly strong ground when he speaks about the costs of the Iraqi war for the United States, because he was one of few elected officials who personally tried to understand what the war would mean to America in terms of troops, money, and duration. The administration’s expectation was that Iraq would be a relatively minor skirmish.
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